The Badal-led Shiromani Akali Dal enters this phase of Punjab politics in a weakened state, carrying the weight of recent electoral humiliation. In 2017, after ruling Punjab for a decade in alliance with the BJP, the party slumped to just 15 seats, losing ground to both Congress and the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP). The 2022 election was even worse, delivering only 3 seats and a diminished vote share of 18.4%. Years of anti-incumbency, allegations of corruption, mismanagement during the drug crisis, and anger over sacrilege incidents severely eroded its once-solid rural Sikh base. The break with the BJP over the 2020 farm laws removed an important vote-pooling partner, leaving SAD to fight alone for the first time in decades. Although the party still commands a loyal cadre, its image under Sukhbir Singh Badal is seen by critics as stale and family-centric, leaving it vulnerable to challenges from newer or revitalized forces.
In contrast, the Giani Harpreet Singh-led rebel faction has entered the field with no electoral record but a wave of symbolic momentum. Harpreet Singh, the former acting Jathedar of the Akal Takht, brings strong religious credentials and the distinction of being the first Scheduled Caste leader to head any Akali Dal faction. His camp claims a membership of 14 lakh, an ambitious enrollment drive for such a young outfit. The group has moved quickly to establish a headquarters in Amritsar and form core committees, signaling an intent to blend religious authority with political organization—an approach reminiscent of the original Akali Dal’s roots. Their strategy appears to be to present themselves as the “real” SAD, reconnecting with Panthic ideals, while portraying the Badal family as out of touch and politically compromised. However, their lack of a tested election apparatus, experience in coalition-building, and formal recognition from the Election Commission could prove significant hurdles.
The split could have serious implications for Punjab politics. For Sikh voters who once saw the Akali Dal as their natural political home, the presence of two rival claimants may cause fragmentation of the Panthic vote. This division could inadvertently benefit other players—most notably AAP, which currently governs Punjab, and the Congress, which retains pockets of influence. If both factions contest separately, they risk splitting the SAD’s traditional rural base, especially in Malwa and Majha regions, allowing opponents to win with smaller margins. On the other hand, if the rebel group succeeds in positioning itself as a morally rejuvenated alternative, it could eat into the Badal camp’s core support and force a reconfiguration of alliances before the 2027 assembly elections.
In the short term, bypolls will be the first testing ground. The Badal-led SAD will be seeking to prove it still has the organizational muscle to mobilize voters, while the Harpreet Singh faction will aim to demonstrate that it can translate religious credibility into ballots. Much will depend on which faction the SGPC and other influential Sikh institutions openly or tacitly back, as well as whether either side can forge tactical pacts with smaller Sikh or farmers’ parties. The political battlefield of Punjab has often been shaped by such alliances, and with the Akali Dal’s house divided, the coming months will be a high-stakes experiment in whether loyalty to legacy outweighs the allure of reform.
Majha (Amritsar, Gurdaspur, Tarn Taran) has historically been the Akali Dal’s ideological heartland, with strong Panthic sentiment and deep ties to Sikh institutions like the SGPC. The Harpreet Singh faction could find fertile ground here because Majha voters tend to respond to religious authority, and Harpreet’s recent role as Akal Takht’s acting Jathedar gives him a built-in moral appeal. His decision to set up party headquarters in Amritsar is a deliberate play to anchor his political base in this region. However, SAD (Badal) still retains strong organizational structures here, particularly in rural Gurdaspur and parts of Tarn Taran, where old guard leaders and local patronage networks remain loyal to Sukhbir. The likely scenario is a serious split in the Panthic vote, giving AAP a chance to poach urban Sikh and Hindu voters in Amritsar and Gurdaspur, and potentially letting Congress hold on to a few rural seats it has managed to defend since 2017.
Malwa (Bathinda, Ludhiana, Mansa, Sangrur, Faridkot, Patiala) is Punjab’s largest and most politically decisive region, and it has been the traditional fortress of the Badal family, especially in Bathinda district. Parkash Singh Badal’s legacy still resonates in parts of Malwa, but the 2017 and 2022 elections showed deep voter fatigue, with SAD losing swathes of its former stronghold to both AAP and Congress. The Harpreet Singh faction will struggle here initially because Malwa politics is less ideologically Panthic and more influenced by caste dynamics, development issues, and local leadership clout. That said, if the rebels can tap into anti-Badal resentment while fielding strong local candidates, they could fracture the SAD’s base enough to prevent Sukhbir from staging a comeback. AAP currently dominates much of Malwa, and a divided Akali vote would only strengthen its grip—especially in urban centers like Ludhiana and Patiala.
Doaba (Jalandhar, Hoshiarpur, Kapurthala, Nawanshahr) is unique in its large Dalit population—often over 30% in many constituencies—which has historically leaned toward Congress but has also swung toward BSP and AAP in recent years. The Harpreet Singh faction, with its first-ever Scheduled Caste leader at the helm, could make unexpected inroads here if it plays its social justice and representation card effectively. SAD (Badal) has been relatively weaker in Doaba over the last two decades, failing to connect with non-Jat Sikh voters and Dalit communities in particular. A three-way contest between AAP, Congress, and the two SAD factions could make results unpredictable. In rural Doaba, if Harpreet Singh can secure alliances with BSP or influential Ravidassia leaders, he may grab enough vote share to position his faction as a serious challenger in select seats, even without winning many outright.
Here’s a scenario-based projection for the 2027 Punjab Assembly election, written fully in paragraphs. Treat these as reasoned ranges rather than certainties; they’re grounded in recent vote patterns, the Akali split dynamics, and region-by-region behavior in Majha, Malwa, and Doaba. Punjab has 117 seats.
In the base case, AAP still enters as the party to beat, but with narrowed margins as anti-incumbency accumulates. A split Akali space keeps Panthic votes divided across Majha and parts of Malwa, while Congress stabilizes in pockets of Doaba and urban centers. In this equilibrium, AAP would be favored for a plurality with roughly 48–60 seats, Congress could track 30–38, SAD (Badal) about 10–16, the Harpreet-led rebel Akali faction around 5–10, the BJP and smaller allies near 3–7, and others 1–3. This picture assumes the Akali factions fight separately, AAP retains a share of its 2022 Malwa strength, and Congress converts local discontent into incremental seat gains rather than a wave.
If there is a partial accommodation between the two Akali groups—anything from quiet seat adjustments in Majha to a late pre-poll understanding—SAD’s aggregate Panthic vote wastage drops and their strike-rate improves notably in rural Sikh belts. In that rapprochement scenario, AAP would still be competitive at 42–52, Congress would hover near 22–28, a reunited or tactically aligned Akali formation could climb to 24–32, the BJP and smaller partners 5–9, and others 1–3. The key moving parts here are organizational unity at the booth level, a credible chief-ministerial face from the Akali side, and the ability to neutralize sacrilege-and-governance baggage with fresh local candidates.
There is also a “rebel-surge” path where the Harpreet-led faction turns symbolic momentum into real ballots in Majha and parts of Doaba, especially if it forges visible ties with influential Sikh institutions or secures endorsements from Dalit/Ravidassia leaders. In that case the rebel faction could touch 14–22 seats, largely at the expense of SAD (Badal), which could slip to 6–10, while AAP stays around 44–54 and Congress at 24–30. BJP would still sit in the 3–6 corridor, others 1–3. This depends on the rebels proving they can raise money, field disciplined candidates, and protect their vote on polling day—hard tasks for any new organization.
A less discussed but plausible path is a Congress comeback powered by candidate-centric contests and a Doaba-first strategy. If Congress corrals Dalit and urban voters while capitalizing on a two-way Akali split in select rural seats, it could climb to 42–50 seats, with AAP slipping to 36–44. In that world, SAD (Badal) might manage 8–12, the rebel Akali faction 4–8, BJP 4–7, and others 1–2. The preconditions are cohesive leadership, minimal factional leakage at ticket distribution, and effective micro-alliances in districts like Jalandhar, Hoshiarpur, and Kapurthala.
Across all scenarios, Malwa remains the kingmaker. If AAP holds its Malwa lattice of booths and local leaders, everyone else fights for second. If Malwa breaks more evenly—say, Congress improves in Ludhiana/Patiala while one Akali faction revives in Bathinda–Faridkot—then the path to plurality becomes a genuine three-cornered contest. Majha will decide the fate of the Akali split: a concentrated swing of even three to five points toward either Akali camp flips multiple seats. Doaba is the volatility engine: small shifts in turnout among Dalit voters or a BSP tie-up can change close results.
Two structural wild cards could tilt the map. The first is the Election Commission’s decision on name/symbol in case of a deepening Akali split; an adverse symbol outcome depresses recognition and costs precious votes in tight races. The second is alliance math: a limited-scope understanding between either Akali group and BSP, or tactical accommodations with farm unions and local outfits, can convert sub-20% vote pockets into actual seats. Watch early bypolls and municipal outcomes for leading indicators—especially whether the rebel faction can protect booths, recruit capable block-level agents, and avoid splits among sarpanch networks.
Putting it all together, the modal outcome today is a hung-leaning plurality where AAP remains first past the post but short of a runaway, with Congress competitive for second and the two Akali formations dividing a Panthic vote that could otherwise deliver a larger bloc. A late Akali reconciliation (even if informal) is the single biggest swing factor that could compress AAP’s lead and produce a more evenly balanced assembly. Conversely, a messy three- or four-way fight that persists into candidate announcements helps the incumbent by lowering the threshold needed to win dozens of constituencies on modest margins.
In Majha, keep a close eye on Amritsar East, Majitha, Batala, Tarn Taran, and Dera Baba Nanak. In the base case, AAP’s urban edge makes Amritsar East and Batala susceptible to modest anti-incumbency or candidate-specific swings, while Majitha and Tarn Taran are classic Panthic battlegrounds where a divided Akali vote can hand narrow wins to AAP or Congress. If there’s Akali reconciliation, Majitha and Tarn Taran tilt back toward the Akali fold, and Dera Baba Nanak becomes a true three-way knife-edge instead of a two-way squeeze. Under a rebel surge, the Harpreet-led faction has the cleanest path in Majha: situational endorsements and turnout among religiously motivated voters could split the traditional SAD base enough to let the rebels outfinish both SAD (Badal) and AAP in Majitha and even threaten in Tarn Taran. In a Congress comeback setting, Dera Baba Nanak and Batala are the ripest—Congress converts steady organization and a small swing among Hindu voters and older rural Sikh blocs into narrow victories, while Amritsar East remains volatile if AAP’s urban vote thins.
In Malwa, watch Bathinda Urban, Lambi, Jalalabad, Mansa, and Ludhiana South. In the base case, AAP’s 2022 lattice keeps Ludhiana South and Bathinda Urban in its column but by slimmer margins; Mansa behaves like a bellwether where local candidate quality and farm-union alignments can swing the race late. If there’s Akali reconciliation, Lambi and Jalalabad immediately sharpen for the Akalis: reduced vote wastage plus legacy networks re-activate, squeezing AAP on the ground and making Bathinda Urban competitive again. A rebel surge hurts SAD (Badal) most here; Malwa is less ideology-driven, so rebels need strong local faces to matter—if they get them, they primarily spoil in Lambi and Jalalabad, indirectly helping AAP retain Bathinda Urban and Ludhiana South while turning Mansa into a four-cornered scramble. In a Congress comeback, the path is candidate-centric: Ludhiana South becomes a pure personal-vote contest; Bathinda Urban turns on middle-class and trader blocs; and Mansa plus one of Lambi/Jalalabad can flip on micro-alliances with kisan outfits and BSP-adjacent networks.
In Doaba, circle Jalandhar West (SC), Shahkot, Phagwara (SC), Hoshiarpur, and Kapurthala. In the base case, AAP and Congress trade narrow leads, while split Panthic votes cap Akali ceilings; Phagwara (SC) and Jalandhar West (SC) are exquisitely sensitive to Dalit turnout and candidate reputation. With Akali reconciliation, the Akalis mostly improve their strike-rate in rural pockets around Shahkot and the outskirts of Kapurthala, converting second-place finishes into coin-flip fights, but still need a Dalit-outreach lane to dent SC-reserved seats. Under a rebel surge, the Harpreet camp’s representation message can resonate: if they land an effective tie-up with Ravidassia influencers or BSP-leaning local leaders, Phagwara (SC) and Jalandhar West (SC) become upset specials and Shahkot turns into a three-way dead heat. In a Congress comeback, Doaba is the engine—Kapurthala and Hoshiarpur lean back toward Congress on organizational muscle and a modest urban swing, while Phagwara (SC) flips on consolidation of Dalit votes coupled with a small decline in AAP’s urban enthusiasm