I. Background: Indus Waters Treaty in Abeyance and a Changed First Principle
India’s decision to place the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance after the Pahalgam massacre is more than a diplomatic signal. It marks a decisive shift in first principles. It recognises that internal security, border stability, and water sovereignty must move in tandem, and that “surplus” flows to the sea are no longer a benign luxury. Abeyance does not, on its own, bring water to Punjab’s fields or recharge depleted aquifers. What it does is open the legal and political space for India to plan, capture, store, and beneficially use its western-river waters within the Indus basin. To act meaningfully in this space, India needs a tight legal framework backed by an engineering programme tuned to today’s hydrology, not the assumptions of the past.
II. The Katarki Bill: What It Is and Why It Matters
Drafted and settled by Mohan V. Katarki, Senior Advocate in the Supreme Court of India and an acknowledged expert in inter-State river water disputes—who once represented the State of Punjab and is not doing so now—the Transfer of Water of Western Rivers (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab) to Eastern Rivers (Ravi, Beas and Sutlej) Bill, 2025 provides precisely such a framework.
In plain terms, the Bill declares Union control over the regulation and development of the Western Rivers to the extent provided in the Act, anchors that control in public interest, and affirms beneficial use as the touchstone of water rights. It empowers the Union to plan and execute transfer projects from the Jhelum and Chenab to Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej, while giving priority allocation to the eastern valleys and the international border belt. Crucially, it places a ring-fence around the Indus system by prohibiting diversion outside the basin. The Bill also sketches a jurisdictional approach aimed at reducing scattershot litigation, and includes a modest “without prejudice” signal on international law.
Short, readable, and to the point, it provides the statutory spine on which engineers and administrators can build with confidence.
III. Our Improvements: Legal and Engineering — One Architecture
A. Legal Upgrades
1) A validation-style “notwithstanding” clause that cures the mischief
The legal terrain is cluttered with decrees and directions rooted in an earlier hydrological and political order. To make the new regime operative, Parliament should adopt a validation-style “notwithstanding” clause. This would ensure that, notwithstanding anything inconsistent in any law or judgment, allocation, conveyance, and distribution within the Indus basin shall be as per the new Act, and that the Act itself constitutes a change in law, policy, and facts—chiefly the Indus Waters Treaty being in abeyance and the Union’s assertion of planning control. Such a clause prospectively neutralises past mandates without offending constitutional propriety.
2) The Supreme Court’s SYL decrees: why the context has shifted
The Sutlej–Yamuna Link (SYL) litigation illustrates the point. In 2002, the Supreme Court decreed that Punjab was bound to construct the SYL canal to deliver water to Haryana. In 2004, the Court reiterated its position and sought execution of that decree. Those judgments were rooted in a particular allocation logic, treaty assumptions, and a canal-centric understanding of irrigation. The context has now changed fundamentally: the Indus Waters Treaty is in abeyance; Punjab’s hydrology has shifted with upstream utilisation; security considerations on the border have deepened; and the farm crisis centres on groundwater depletion rather than canal neglect. A new statute that affirms basin-first allocation, prohibits out-of-basin diversions, and hardwires aquifer recharge reflects a changed reality. It allows Parliament to validate a new regime and prospectively render the 2002 and 2004 decrees ineffective without “overruling” the Court.
3) A forum design that works: government-only, Article 131, and direct appeal
The Bill’s reference to Article 136 (special-leave petitions) is not sufficient to structure inter-governmental litigation. What is needed is a framework that:
Bars ordinary civil-court jurisdiction over matters arising under the Act;
Confines standing to governments (Union–State or State–State), naturally placing disputes in the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction under Article 131;
Establishes a specialised Indus Basin Authority or Tribunal for technical determinations, with direct appeals to the Supreme Court; and
Reserves interim stays on strategic hydrology works to the Supreme Court alone, and only in exceptional, reasoned cases.
This respects judicial review while sharply limiting paralysing injunctions.
4) Keep the basin whole: no “SYL-2” detours
The prohibition on out-of-basin diversion must be preserved and clarified by definition. The basin should be mapped to the Yamuna divide, blocking any transfer into the Yamuna system, including potential Himachal-to-Yamuna channels sometimes described as “SYL-2”. Likewise, “Saraswati rejuvenation” diversions must be ruled out as beyond the statute’s scope.
5) Clarify the Ghaggar/Hakra point
Haryana’s Ghaggar tract may be developed within its own basin; irrigation and flood control on its left bank are unobjectionable. But Ghaggar is not a backdoor for exporting Indus-basin water into the Yamuna system.
6) Retire the Eradi Tribunal — interim only, never final
The Ravi–Beas (Eradi) Tribunal, constituted in the mid-1980s, has never delivered a final award. What exists is an interim arrangement that was never even notified by the Centre, producing decades of limbo. Hydrology, water availability, and priorities have fundamentally changed since. The new Act should abate all pending references before the Tribunal and migrate allocations to the statutory framework. This clears the decks and ends a process that has long outlived its assumptions.
B. Engineering Upgrades
1) A National Indus Basin Authority (NIBA) with a mission charter
Create NIBA under the Ministry of Jal Shakti, mandated to plan, sanction, and execute a Western-to-Eastern Transfer Programme strictly within the Indus system. Give it powers of construction, coordination, and accountability through time-bound milestones.
2) Storage and link corridors
Build upstream storages on the Chenab and Jhelum, optimise existing hydro projects, and create a corridor of transfer to Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej with balancing reservoirs. All infrastructure must remain within the Indus basin.
3) Managed Aquifer Recharge (MAR) as a statutory duty
Punjab’s irrigation is overwhelmingly groundwater-dependent (almost 73% to 75%). Even with canal efficiency and extension, social and physical limits prevent canals from absorbing large volumes. The Act should mandate Managed Aquifer Recharge: district-level recharge plans, flood-season diversions into percolation tanks and infiltration basins, retrofitted tubewells for injection, and annual recharge targets. Compliance should be measured against a single success metric—Punjab’s stage of extraction must fall below 100% and remain there. MAR should enjoy the same protection from stay orders as strategic hydrology works.
4) Realistic absorption: canals for efficiency, aquifers for volume
Canals should be improved and lined, but the lion’s share of additional availability must be channelled to groundwater recharge. This balances surface distribution with aquifer sustainability.
IV. The “Notwithstanding” Clause — Explicitly Stated
The Act should expressly state that it operates notwithstanding any prior law, order, or judgment, and that it is founded on a new legal-hydrological reality created by the Indus Waters Treaty being in abeyance and Union control. This is the constitutionally proper way to prospectively supersede the Supreme Court’s 2002 and 2004 SYL decrees and to prevent their continued effect in today’s altered conditions.
V. Scrapping the Ravi–Beas Tribunal — Necessary Housekeeping
The Eradi Tribunal delivered only an interim arrangement, never a final award. Its assumptions are obsolete, its process exhausted, and its very notification incomplete. The new law should scrap it outright, abating all pending matters and folding allocations into the new basin-first statutory framework.
VI. One Voice from Punjab — A United Recommendation
This issue is not a partisan football. It concerns border security, farm economics, aquifer rescue, and the end of litigation paralysis. All political leaders of Punjab should, therefore, speak with one voice and unanimously recommend this strengthened Bill to the Union Government. Their collective message should be simple: keep the water inside the Indus basin, recharge aquifers first, end the Eradi Tribunal’s limbo, and channel any disputes directly to the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction.
VII. Looking Ahead
The Indus Waters Treaty being in abeyance has created a rare and urgent opening. The Katarki Bill offers a robust framework, but it must be fortified with a validation-style notwithstanding clause, a government-only forum design under Article 131, explicit basin guardrails, mandatory aquifer recharge, the abatement of the Ravi–Beas Tribunal, and a definitive quietus on the Supreme Court’s SYL decrees. The Sidhu’s update of the Katarki Bill incorporates all these features in a clear legal form. Only then can India turn what might otherwise remain rhetorical resolve into tangible, durable results. This is a legally sound, engineering-realistic and sovereignty-affirming path—one that merits unanimous support from Punjab’s leadership and a swift, statesmanlike response from New Delhi.