This piece takes a strictly constitutional-and-statutory look at how India’s reservation architecture has evolved, what the Supreme Court has permitted or limited, which amendments have re-shaped those limits—and, crucially, what space still exists for general (unreserved) candidates. We are not arguing for or against reservation; the lens is diagnostic: where the law still preserves open competition, and where that space is being squeezed.
The 10-year myth—and what it really covered
The famous “ten years” applied only to political reservations—the seats set aside for SC/ST in the Lok Sabha and State Assemblies under Article 334. That sunset was extended repeatedly and now runs to 2030. It never applied to reservations in education or public employment. Those are enabled by Articles 15 and 16 and were never time-limited.
The constitutional portals that govern today
In education, Article 15(4) (added soon after Champakam Dorairajan) allows special provisions for socially and educationally backward classes and for SC/ST; Article 15(5) (2005) extends this to most institutions (except minority institutions). Article 15(6) (2019) introduced EWS—a 10% economic window for those not covered by SC/ST/OBC.
In public employment, Article 16(4) enables reservation for backward classes inadequately represented; 16(4A) allows promotions with reservation for SC/ST; 16(4B) lets governments treat backlog vacancies as a separate class in a given recruitment year. Article 335 requires that administrative efficiency be kept in view. Together, these provisions are not self-executing guarantees but enabling powers: the State may frame schemes, but must justify them within constitutional limits.
Is reservation a fundamental right? No—an enabling discretion
The Supreme Court has consistently said reservation provisions are enabling, not compellable. A government may choose to provide or withhold reservation, provided it acts within equality norms. That matters for the unreserved: challenges succeed less by attacking the idea of reservation and more by showing the preconditions are unmet (e.g., no quantifiable data for promotions, misapplied rosters, or over-breadth).
The 50% ceiling—and the EWS “overhang”
Indra Sawhney (1992) laid down the modern template: reservations normally should not exceed 50%; the creamy layer must be excluded for OBCs; and anyone selected on merit belongs to the open (unreserved) list, not counted against a quota. The Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the ceiling—most forcefully while striking down the Maratha law (2021) for breaching 50% without “extraordinary circumstances.”
The big outlier is EWS. In 2022, the Court upheld the 10% EWS quota created by the 103rd Amendment, and held that the 50% cap is not part of the Constitution’s basic structure. Practically, EWS carves 10% out of what was previously the UR pool (though it benefits economically weaker persons within the erstwhile “general” group).
Promotions, creamy layer, and the efficiency brake
Parliament’s 77th/81st/82nd/85th Amendments tried to sustain SC/ST promotion policies. The Court responded with guard-rails. In M. Nagaraj (2006), it held that a State wishing to reserve promotions must compile quantifiable data demonstrating “inadequacy of representation,” and must keep administrative efficiency (Article 335) in view. In Jarnail Singh (2018), the Court removed the need to re-prove “backwardness” for SC/ST promotions, but applied the creamy-layer exclusion to promotions—to prevent the most advanced among the reserved categories from cornering all benefits. These requirements are potent levers for UR officers when promotion quotas lack contemporary data or ignore creamy-layer filters.
Vertical vs horizontal: the roster maths that often drains “open merit”
Indian law distinguishes vertical (social group) reservations—SC, ST, OBC, and now EWS—from horizontal (across-the-board) reservations—women, persons with disabilities, ex-servicemen, sportspersons, etc. The Supreme Court has made the method explicit: horizontal reservations must be adjusted within each vertical category, not piled on top. When recruitment agencies super-add horizontals, they unlawfully eat into the open list. Courts have repeatedly corrected such rosters.
“Special categories”—what fits, what doesn’t
Ex-servicemen and persons with disabilities preferences are typically horizontal and must be worked within each vertical category.
Sportspersons, dependants of freedom fighters, or other lineage-based preferences are policy devices that must still pass Articles 14–16 tests of rational nexus and proportionality; they cannot morph into new vertical silos or inflate totals.
Compassionate appointments (death-in-harness) are a narrow humanitarian exception, not a parallel recruitment channel; the Court has limited them to alleviating immediate penury.
Attempts at total or near-total reservations (e.g., 100% teachers in Scheduled Areas) have been struck down.
Amendments that re-shaped the terrain
First (1951): inserted 15(4) after Champakam, enabling educational reservations.
93rd (2005): inserted 15(5) (admissions in Central/state-aided institutions), later upheld.
77th (1995), 81st (2000), 82nd (2000), 85th (2001): created 16(4A) (promotions), 16(4B) (backlog over-and-above that year’s 50%), relaxed standards via 335, and consequential seniority—all conditioned by Nagaraj/Jarnail.
102nd (2018) gave constitutional status to NCBC and introduced 342A (SEBC lists). In 2021, the 105th Amendment restored States’ power to identify their own SEBCs after the Maratha verdict’s reading of 102nd.
103rd (2019): introduced EWS (Articles 15(6) and 16(6)) and was upheld in 2022.
Article 334 extensions (most recently 104th): political reservations now run to 2030.
So how much space is left for the unreserved?
Think in three buckets:
(1) Open competition seats. Even where vertical quotas exist, the open (unreserved) slate remains—and meritorious SC/ST/OBC/EWS candidates do not consume their quota if they win here. Proper rosters preserve roughly half the posts as open in steady state; that space shrinks in a given year if backlog (16(4B)) is being cleared or if horizontals are misapplied.
(2) EWS (10%). This is the only reservation that includes economically weaker candidates from the erstwhile general pool—but it excludes those covered by SC/ST/OBC. For eligible UR candidates, it is a new window; for non-EWS UR, it’s a clear reduction of their previous open share.
(3) Guard-rails that protect the open field. The 50% ceiling for vertical caste-based reservations (barring EWS) still bites; horizontal reservations must be run within categories, not super-added; promotion quotas must rest on fresh, cadre-wise data and enforce creamy-layer exclusion; and extreme quotas (near-100%) fail constitutional muster.
A practical playbook for the unreserved
Demand the roster math. Ask for the post-based roster for the recruitment year; check whether horizontals (women/PwD/ex-servicemen/sportspersons) were adjusted within verticals. If they were layered over the vertical matrix, the open list was unlawfully cannibalised.
Use the ceiling. Outside EWS and properly ring-fenced backlog, crossing 50% for vertical caste-based quotas needs “extraordinary circumstances” backed by evidence.
Audit promotions. Where promotion reservations are invoked, demand quantifiable data (cadre/post-wise) on “inadequacy of representation” and proof that efficiency was considered. If the State cannot produce this, the scheme is vulnerable.
Keep creamy layer meaningful. For OBCs, and for SC/ST in promotions post-Jarnail Singh, creamy-layer exclusion must be enforced and thresholds kept current.
Police lineage-based perks. Benefits to “lineal descendants” (freedom fighters, etc.) must remain horizontal and narrowly tailored. If they displace better-merit candidates or balloon totals, they are attackable under equality principles.
Remember what is not reservation. Compassionate appointments cannot become a side door to regular recruitment.
Bottom line
The Constitution permits reservation through specific enabling clauses; it did not time-limit education or employment reservations. The Supreme Court’s guard-rails—50% ceiling, creamy layer, data-backed promotions, and proper horizontal adjustment—still preserve meaningful space for open competition. The one deliberate policy choice that compresses the old unreserved slice is EWS, now constitutionally entrenched. For general category candidates, the winning strategy is procedural precision: target illegality in design and execution—roster maths, promotion data, creamy-layer enforcement—rather than a blanket attack on the existence of reservation itself.
Yet there is a sobering political reality. No major party has stepped forward to speak in defence of what some anti-reservation voices pointedly call the “endangered species” of merit-driven, open-seats candidates. Given the deep intertwining of caste and religion in India’s political calculus, it is highly unlikely that such advocacy will emerge anytime soon. This leaves the unreserved segment with little more than three options: petition, prayer, and protest.