In the aftermath of calamity, causality is often the first casualty. Social media thrives on simple villains; hydrology rarely offers them. The recent floods in Punjab—and the swirl of commentary around Principal Secretary (Water Resources) Krishan Kumar—demand a steadier, fact-based view.
A record of delivery and integrity
Krishan Kumar, a 1997-batch IAS officer of the Punjab cadre, is no stranger to performance under pressure. When I served as Secretary, School Education, Punjab (2007–2009), he worked with me as Director General School Education. In that role he ensured that Sarv Shiksha Abhiyan funds were not only sanctioned but actually utilised in classrooms. He also put in place systems to secure teacher attendance in remote border schools and far-flung rural areas—tasks that required relentless fieldwork, clean accounting, and zero tolerance for excuses. His integrity was, and remains, beyond doubt.
That track record matters today, when he is once again at the centre of a storm where professional competence and honesty are vital. A man who demonstrated clean hands and results in education is unlikely to fall short of the same standards in water resources.
Tight resources, structured priorities
The Finance Department’s envelope is limited. It is easy to draw up a wish-list of embankments, spurs and river-training works across the Ravi, Beas, Sutlej and Ghaggar. It is far harder to fund them all at once. In practice, the Department relies on priorities sent by Deputy Commissioners after pre- and post-monsoon inspections; these are then sifted at the State Flood Control Board chaired by the Chief Minister.
That process is neither arbitrary nor casual—it is triage. And like in any emergency room, triage means choices. To accuse the Principal Secretary of “neglect” simply because certain reaches of rivers did not receive immediate attention is to misunderstand the severe constraints under which such prioritisation takes place.
Hydrology is an art and a science
Rivers are dynamic systems. Reinforcing one bank often transfers energy to the opposite bank; a “fix” here can trigger an attack there. The Ravi poses additional, non-trivial constraints: through long stretches in Pathankot, Gurdaspur and Amritsar, it doubles as the international boundary. The right bank lies across the border—outside India’s control—while the left bank on our side is more prone to cutting because of the gradient.
Add to this the incomplete Shahpur Kandi Dam project (which, once finished, would improve balancing of releases from Ranjit Sagar) and you have a system where perfect control is neither quick nor cheap. Operational protocols at the century-old Madhopur Headworks also merit a technical audit—why a side gate was opened, whether a central bay would have created a more stable channel, and how gate operations can be modernised.
These are not matters of “negligence” but of engineering judgment, legacy infrastructure, and state-level funding choices.
Expenditure vs. “allocations”
Numbers circulating online blur crucial distinctions. The figures for 2022–2025 are expenditures, not mere “budget allocations.” Roughly, canal heads saw spends of ₹1,100 crore (2022), ₹3,200 crore (2023), ₹2,700 crore (2024) and ₹3,000 crore (2025), while drainage/rivers saw ₹80 crore, ₹60 crore, ₹40 crore and ₹30 crore respectively.
Canal outlays were largely devoted to lining and modernisation of legacy systems and for laying pipelines/watercourses—works that qualified for multi-source planned funding: CWC, NABARD, Special Assistance, various GoI schemes (including micro-irrigation and “Khet Khet Mein Pani”), World Bank assistance, and other centrally sponsored windows conceived in 2021 for a five-year, phased rollout.
By contrast, river-training and drain desilting depend far more on state funds. When the state kitty is tight or Letters of Credit are delayed, drainage heads are the first to feel the pinch. That disparity is structural, not the whim of a principal secretary—and it is precisely why headline comparisons (“₹3,000 crore vs ₹50–60 crore”) can mislead.
On dam releases and management calls
Release decisions are constrained by upstream inflows, gate health, downstream carrying capacity and real-time forecasts—none of which are under the absolute command of a single officer. Where there are allegations about the timing or quantum of releases (for example at Ranjit Sagar or gate operations at Madhopur), the remedy is a transparent technical review of logs, telemetry and standard operating procedures—not trial by meme.
It should also be recognised that on the Ravi, the state is playing on half a board. Pakistan’s fortified right bank means that natural flows are often deflected to our more vulnerable left bank. To expect one officer—or even one department—to “fix” this with limited funds and ageing structures is unrealistic.
Charge-sheets and vigilance actions are uncomfortable, but they exist to enforce standards; they are not meant to paralyse initiative. If resignations or VRS occurred, causes may range from personal choices to postings to career ceilings. The answer is managerial: clearer delegation for flood-season works, protection for good-faith decisions taken under uncertainty, timely promotions, and field-level empowerment—so XENs/SDOs act on SOPs without waiting for micro-orders from Chandigarh.
Again, these are systemic issues that call for reform, not scapegoating.
What should happen now
Right now is the time for rescue, relief and rehabilitation; blame, accountability and any determination of culpability should follow after the waters recede and facts are audited. In parallel, the state should:
Ring-fence a predictable drainage/river-training corpus insulated from intra-year cuts.
Finish Shahpur Kandi and modernise gate-operation SOPs at Madhopur with real-time decision support.
Upgrade forecasting (radar, telemetry) and pre-positioned works along priority reaches identified by DCs and the Flood Control Board.
Institutionalise after-action reviews, so lessons on spur design, bank armouring and channel training feed the next season’s plan
Krishan Kumar has a reputation for integrity and stamina, demonstrated in School Education and now tested in Water Resources. To scapegoat a professional mid-crisis is to weaken the very system we want to strengthen. The political executive should back its officer while commissioning a rigorous technical review. At the field level, leadership like that shown by Deputy Commissioner Sakshi Sawhney deserves recognition—she did excellent work as DC Patiala during the devastating floods of 2023 and again led from the front in relief and rescue operations in the flood-ravaged Ajnala sector of Amritsar, where the Ravi river wrought havoc in the border area villages. These examples underline the importance of strong district leadership in crisis. The state must therefore allow the field to be led, as it should, by the Principal Secretary in concert with the Financial Commissioner (Revenue), the Chief Secretary, and district teams—Deputy Commissioners with their police chiefs—so that Punjab’s flood protection, and its relief and rehabilitation, proceed with coherence, speed, and confidence.