The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is grappling with its ambition to become a standalone political force in Punjab, a state where its efforts are undermined by structural weaknesses, a misaligned strategy, and deep-seated mistrust among key demographics. The 2020 split with its long-time ally, the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD), forced the BJP to contest elections independently, exposing its inability to resonate with Punjab’s unique cultural and demographic fabric. The party’s persistent anti-farmer image, failure to address Sikh insecurities, and rigid adherence to a national playbook have capped its electoral potential. To break its vote share ceiling and challenge Congress and AAP, the BJP must innovate, strengthen its organization, and craft a Punjab-specific approach that dispels psychological fears and embraces new leadership.
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The BJP’s organizational limitations in Punjab are stark. Historically overshadowed by the SAD, the party’s grassroots structure never matured, resembling a bonsai stunted under its ally’s shadow. Its cadre, primarily urban upper-caste Hindus (roughly 18% of the population), lacks traction among rural Jat Sikhs (about 25%) and Scheduled Castes (31.94%, both Sikh and Hindu), who dominate Punjab’s electorate. The BJP’s 18.56% vote share in the 2024 Lok Sabha elections, up from 9.63% in 2019, marked progress but yielded no seats, highlighting a ceiling rooted in its urban-rural divide. Prominent leaders from the Congress who joined the BJP, such as Capt Amarinder Singh, Sunil Jakhar, Manpreet Singh Badal and Ravneet Singh Bittu to bring electoral heft but face resistance from the party’s old guard. This bonsai leadership, accustomed to operating under the shadows of SAD, perceives newcomers as encroaching on their exclusive territory, fostering internal discord that weakens the party’s cohesion and outreach.
The BJP’s most enduring liability is its anti-farmer image, cemented during the 2020-21 farm law protests. Although the laws aimed to modernize agriculture and benefit farmers through market access, the BJP failed to counter the aggressive narrative—amplified by opposition parties and farmer unions—that portrayed them as pro-corporate and anti-agrarian. The protests, led largely by Jat Sikhs, entrenched the perception that the BJP prioritizes urban and corporate interests over Punjab’s agrarian heartland. Despite repealing the laws in 2021, the party has not been able to win over the rural Punjab.
Equally damaging is the psychological fear among Sikhs that the BJP, influenced by its ideological parent, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), seeks to assimilate Sikhism into Hinduism. This insecurity stems from Article 25 of the Indian Constitution, which includes Sikhs, Jains, and Buddhists under the definition of “Hindus” for certain legal purposes. The RSS’s emphasis on cultural unity, often seen as Hindu majoritarianism, amplifies these concerns. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s initiatives—reopening the Kartarpur Corridor, commemorating Sikh gurus, and ensuring justice for 1984 riot victims—have been well-intentioned but insufficient to bridge the trust deficit. Dispelling this fear requires innovative thinking and openness to new ideas, such as supporting constitutional clarity on Sikhism’s distinct status or fostering dialogue with Sikh intellectuals and religious leaders. The BJP’s rigid ideological walls, however, make it impermeable to such adaptations, limiting its ability to connect with Punjab’s 57.75% Sikh population.
The Congress’s paradoxical resilience in Punjab further complicates the BJP’s prospects. This is a classic case study for political science students. Despite its role in the 1984 Operation Blue Star, which damaged the Golden Temple and destroyed the Akal Takht, and the subsequent anti-Sikh riots that killed thousands, the Congress has formed governments in Punjab three times—in 1992, 2002, and 2017. This unique position reflects its ability to balance Sikh and Hindu votes through localized leadership and pragmatic alliances, a skill BJP needs to create. In the 2024 Lok Sabha polls, the Congress won seven seats with a 26.30% vote share, while the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) secured three seats with 26.02%. The SAD, weakened by internal crises, retained Bathinda with 13.42%, and radical Sikh candidates like Amritpal Singh tapped into Panthic sentiments to win two seats. The BJP’s 18.56% vote share, though improved, underscores its confinement to urban Hindu pockets and failure to penetrate rural Sikh and Scheduled Caste constituencies.
The BJP’s fundamental error is superimposing its national playbook—centered on Hindutva, development, and urban consolidation—onto Punjab, ignoring the state’s demographic behavior. Sikhs prioritize agrarian issues and religious identity, while Scheduled Castes seek social justice and economic upliftment but rarely vote en bloc. Upper-caste Hindus, the BJP’s core base, are a numerical minority. Outreach efforts or highlighting Modi’s Sikh-friendly gestures, appear tokenistic, failing to counter the anti-farmer narrative or assuage fears of cultural assimilation.
To break its electoral ceiling, the BJP must adopt a Punjab-specific template. First, it should build a diverse grassroots cadre, prioritizing Jat Sikh and Scheduled Caste leaders to bridge the urban-rural divide. Second, it must shed its anti-farmer image by crafting a robust communication strategy to counter opposition narratives. Third, it should address Sikh insecurities through innovative measures, such as supporting amendments to Article 25, promoting Sikh representation in national institutions, and fostering open dialogue with Sikh clergy and community leaders to dispel RSS-related fears. Fourth, it must integrate newcomers like into its structure, overcoming the old guard’s territorial instincts to create a unified leadership. Finally, the BJP could capitalize on the SAD’s decline by courting moderate Sikh voters with policies that respect Punjab’s agrarian and cultural ethos.
Punjab’s political history underscores that success hinges on appealing to its diverse electorate. The Congress’s recovery from 1984 and AAP’s 2022 Assembly sweep demonstrate the power of localized, inclusive strategies. The BJP, burdened by its Hindutva image, anti-farmer perception, and failure to address Sikh insecurities, must embrace adaptability and innovation. Its 18.56% vote share in 2024 signals potential but also its limits. Only by strengthening its organization, embracing new leaders, and crafting a Punjab-centric strategy can the BJP challenge the Congress-AAP dominance and reshape Punjab’s political future.