Punjab, a border state with strategic, economic, and agricultural importance, continues to face pressing challenges, ranging from drug abuse, unemployment, and farmer distress to law-and-order issues, declining industry, and inter-state disputes like SYL water sharing. Despite the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) being in power at the Centre for over a decade, its state unit in Punjab has not effectively leveraged this position to seek solutions or draw urgent attention to Punjab’s critical concerns.
This inaction has raised serious questions: Why is the BJP’s Punjab unit, which could serve as a bridge between the state and the Union Government, failing to play that role? Why is there no visible effort from the state unit to champion Punjab’s demands before New Delhi?
One major reason is the weak political base of the BJP in Punjab. Historically, the BJP was a junior partner in the SAD-BJP alliance, primarily contesting urban Hindu-majority constituencies. Following the fallout with the Shiromani Akali Dal over the farm laws and the massive public backlash during the farmers’ protest, the BJP has struggled to rebuild its image and grassroots presence in Punjab.
Without strong public support or a well-rooted cadre, the BJP’s Punjab unit lacks the moral and political authority to aggressively represent Punjab’s interests in front of the Union Government. Its leaders fear that pushing hard on state-centric issues might expose their own limited influence, both within Punjab and within the central BJP leadership.
Many BJP leaders in Punjab are caught in a delicate position. On one hand, they must remain loyal to the central leadership; on the other, they know that some of Punjab’s most pressing issues—like the treatment of farmers, pending central funds, or the handling of religious sentiments—require confrontation or at least firm advocacy with Delhi.
However, there seems to be an unspoken hesitation to “disturb the high command”. State leaders fear that vocal criticism or persistent lobbying might be viewed as dissent or disloyalty within the party ranks. As a result, they often avoid directly challenging central policies, even if those policies negatively impact Punjab.
Unlike states where BJP has towering regional leaders (e.g., Himanta Biswa Sarma in Assam, Yogi Adityanath in UP), BJP Punjab lacks a charismatic mass leader with the stature and confidence to take up Punjab’s cause at the national level. Leaders like Ashwani Sharma or Sunil Jakhar are experienced, but not yet politically dominant.
Without a strong leader who can raise Punjab’s demands assertively in the party’s national forums or in Parliament, the BJP Punjab unit remains more of a passive wing than an active stakeholder. This leadership vacuum has left the party with a reactive rather than proactive posture.
The BJP’s reputation in Punjab took a severe hit after the nationwide farmers’ agitation (2020–2021), in which Punjabi farmers played a leading role. The BJP was seen as the architect of the controversial farm laws, and the Centre’s handling of the protests further alienated large sections of the population.
Although the farm laws were repealed, the political damage was done. In this climate, BJP Punjab leaders have grown cautious. They hesitate to raise local issues—especially those related to agriculture, farmer loans, or federal rights—because doing so might reopen wounds and remind people of the BJP’s role in past missteps.
This political image crisis has led to an awkward silence on many issues that require active central intervention, including MSP guarantees, compensation for crop damage, and rural employment.
The BJP, as a party, often functions with a centralized national agenda. The leadership in Delhi sets the priorities—whether it’s development, nationalism, or international diplomacy—and the state units are expected to align with that vision.
As a result, the Punjab unit has been more focused on echoing the national party’s narrative rather than shaping or demanding a Punjab-centric development model. Many state leaders spend more time defending national policies than advocating for local solutions—be it for drug control, the declining industrial base in Ludhiana, or border security concerns.
In other states, regional pressure—through protests, legislative pressure, or strong local media—often forces political parties to act. In Punjab, the BJP is not the ruling party, nor does it have a large number of MLAs. This makes it easier for the party to remain in the shadows rather than take political risks.
Moreover, civil society and farmer unions still treat the BJP with suspicion, reducing the scope for public cooperation. This lack of grassroots engagement further distances the state BJP from Punjab’s real pulse and prevents it from pushing urgent issues to the Centre effectively.
In recent years, there have been multiple opportunities where the Punjab BJP could have played a proactive role—be it seeking additional disaster relief for floods, pushing for industrial revival packages, demanding stronger border security from BSF, or ensuring Punjab’s fair share in central schemes. But in most cases, the BJP state unit either remained silent or issued token statements, without real follow-through.
This inaction has disappointed even sections of the urban electorate that once supported the BJP, who now see the party as more focused on political optics than meaningful governance or advocacy.
Punjab continues to face socio-economic and political challenges that require the Centre’s urgent attention. As the party in power at the national level, the BJP has both the resources and the responsibility to act. Yet, its state unit remains largely inactive, disconnected from the grassroots, and hesitant to confront or negotiate with its own central leadership.
Unless the Punjab BJP begins to act as a true representative of the state’s interests—rather than a mere extension of the national party—it will struggle to gain relevance or credibility. The people of Punjab expect action, not silence. If the BJP fails to raise Punjab’s voice in Delhi, it will continue to be viewed as an outsider in its own state.