In the 1989 Lok Sabha elections, the Shiromani Akali Dal (Amritsar), led by Simranjit Singh Mann, shocked the Indian political establishment by winning 6 out of 13 parliamentary seats including Simaranjit Singh Mann, Bimal Kaur, Rajinder Kaur Bulara, Rajdev Singh, Sucha Singh, andJagdev Singh in Punjab, despite Mann himself being disqualified from taking his seat due to his refusal to take an oath under the Indian Constitution, which includes the name of the President of India whom Mann held responsible for Operation Blue Star. This symbolic yet significant victory came at a time when Punjab was in deep turmoil, scarred by militancy, human rights violations, and a collapse of political order.
Yet, despite such a historic breakthrough, the party never managed to transform that momentum into long-term political dominance or electoral relevance. Today, SAD (Amritsar) remains a fringe outfit with limited influence, mostly active in select regions and around specific Sikh religious or identity-based issues.
Simranjit Singh Mann and his party projected a strong Panthic (Sikh religious identity-based) ideology that appealed to a section of the population deeply hurt by Operation Blue Star and the post-1984 atmosphere. While this helped in mobilising emotional support in the immediate post-conflict years, the party lacked a broader governance or development-oriented agenda.
Their political narrative was largely centred on Sikh sovereignty, anti-Centre rhetoric, and identity issues, which, although powerful for a time, did not address the everyday needs of the average Punjabi voter, such as education, health, employment, and infrastructure.
As the militancy period subsided and normalcy began to return, voters shifted focus from identity to stability and development, leaving behind the emotional wave that had powered SAD (Amritsar)’s initial success.
Mann’s firm stance on Sikh separatism and his refusal to participate in constitutional processes (such as taking the parliamentary oath) isolated his party from the national political dialogue. While this made him a symbolic figure for some, it alienated a vast majority of the electorate, who wanted their representatives to function within the democratic framework and deliver tangible results.
This isolationist strategy caused the party to lose credibility over time. Unlike the mainstream Shiromani Akali Dal (Badal), which engaged with national parties, contested elections regularly, and formed governments, Mann’s party remained confined to moral posturing, religious rhetoric, and ideological purity—with little influence on real policy.
By the mid-1990s, militancy in Punjab had been largely suppressed. The return to peace and the rebuilding of civil society changed public sentiment drastically. People were tired of violence, instability, and identity-based politics. They began craving peace, prosperity, and economic progress.
In this new environment, SAD (Amritsar)’s hardline positions began to appear outdated or even counterproductive. While Simranjit Mann remained consistent in his ideology, it did not resonate with a population that had moved on from the painful memories of conflict.
One of the critical shortcomings of the SAD (Amritsar) was the lack of a strong, grassroots-level party organization. The party never managed to build a sustained cadre base across Punjab, nor did it create institutions to train future leaders or connect with youth and farmers consistently.
In contrast, the mainstream SAD (Badal) and even the Congress had powerful organizational structures—workers at the village level, alliances with religious bodies, and effective electoral machinery. SAD (Amritsar) remained heavily dependent on Simranjit Singh Mann’s personality and symbolism, without institutional depth.
SAD (Amritsar) often chose to boycott elections, or contest them in limited constituencies with poor preparation. This strategy further alienated them from the democratic mainstream. Boycotting elections, while intended to send a political message, often results in political irrelevance.
Moreover, Mann’s speeches and messaging remained largely symbolic, focusing on historical grievances rather than current policy solutions. This may have appealed to emotionally driven voters for a time, but failed to generate sustainable electoral traction.
The party also faced internal divisions and leadership stagnation. Mann never groomed a second line of leadership, and the party suffered from factionalism and limited generational renewal. In addition, the party rarely formed meaningful alliances with other regional or national parties, which further reduced its influence.
In Indian politics, alliances are crucial for smaller or ideology-based parties to amplify their voice. SAD (Amritsar) largely remained isolated—by choice or by rejection—which stunted its political reach.
In later years, the Shiromani Akali Dal (Badal) repositioned itself as the dominant voice of Sikh politics through control over the SGPC and close ties with religious institutions like the Akal Takht. Even after losing credibility post-2015 due to sacrilege incidents and governance issues, SAD (Badal) remained a better-organized force.
By 2022, even AAP (Aam Aadmi Party) managed to break into rural and Sikh-majority areas by focusing on governance, services, and change. SAD (Amritsar), stuck in its ideological cocoon, could not match this broader appeal.
Mann has contested dozens of elections over the past three decades, but his victories have been rare. His 2022 Lok Sabha by-election win from Sangrur was a surprise and was largely attributed to voter disillusionment with AAP, low voter turnout, and Mann’s symbolic appeal in the aftermath of Sidhu Moosewala’s death.
However, this victory again did not translate into a revival of the party. Mann’s speeches in Parliament often return to historical and ideological themes, rather than engaging with contemporary governance, thus limiting his impact on national politics.
Shiromani Akali Dal (Amritsar), under Simranjit Singh Mann, remains an important symbolic voice for a specific historical and ideological viewpoint, but it has failed to evolve into a mass political force. Its early success in 1989–90 came at a time of deep crisis and emotional mobilization, but sustained political relevance requires adaptation, organization, and responsiveness to people’s changing aspirations.
Mann’s refusal to compromise on his principles may earn him personal respect from a section of the population, but in the pragmatic arena of politics, his party has remained marginal. Until it redefines its vision, modernizes its outreach, and addresses people’s real needs beyond ideology, SAD (Amritsar) is likely to remain on the fringes of Punjab’s political scene.