Punjab Outlook

Editor’s Note:It is our privilege to present “The Political Economy of the Cycles of Violence and Non-violence in the Sikh Struggle”, a scholarly article by Paritam Singh, Emeritus Professor of Economics, which will be published as a third series out of  four-part series. This insightful work offers a thoughtful analysis of the historical, political, and economic dimensions of the Sikh struggle, providing readers with a deeper understanding of the factors that have shaped its evolution over time. We believe this article is of significant historical and educational value and will serve as an important resource for students, researchers, and anyone interested in Sikh history and contemporary political thought. We sincerely hope our readers will find this series both informative and engaging.— Editor

The extremist groups who advocated militant confrontation with the centre denounced the accord as ‘sell out’. Sant Longowal was assassinated by a previously unknown group of Sikh militants on 20 August 20 1985. His assassins represented the raw sentiments of the most bitter and militant sections of the Sikh community, who considered his act of reaching an accord as a surrender to the Delhi government. His death left large sections of the Sikh community shocked and bewildered. The vast majority of Sikhs felt sad at his death, even if some of them were opposed to the accord. Fear of being left leaderless at this critical juncture in the history of the Sikh community in post-independent India made the overwhelming majority of the Sikhs rally behind Surjit Singh Barnala, who was considered the most trusted associate of Longowal. In the elections held to the Punjab State Assembly on 25 September, barely a month after the assassination of Longowal, the Akali Dal, under the leadership of Barnala, won a resounding victory. A section of the Hindu voters had also voted for the Akali Dal because they feared that defeat of the Akali Dal might strengthen militant Sikh groups.

The militant groups, which had called for a boycott of the elections, did not get much response beyond a few isolated villages. The installation of Barnala’s democratically elected government in Punjab also allowed the militant dissidents to operate more freely and openly. Two pro-militant organisations became prominent during this period: Damdami Taksal, a religiously orthodox Sikh seminary, which was headed before 1984 by Bhindranwale; and the All India Sikh Students Federation (AISSF), which was headed before 1984 by Bhindranwale’s close associate, Amrik Singh, who hadalso died resisting the Indian army’s entry into the Golden Temple in June 5. The two organisations had an uneasy alliance with a newly formed Akali Dal, which named itself the United Akali Dal. The United Akali Dal was headed by Baba Joginder Singh, the father of Bhindranwale. All these three organisations had widespread but diffused support among the Sikhs in Punjab. They had, however, very organised and widespread support among the diaspora Sikh population and the financial assistance provided by the diaspora Sikhs further added to the political weight of these organisations. The Barnala government and the militant organisations competed with each other to secure support from the Sikh community; the key to their respective strength depended crucially on what the central government was going to do regarding the implementation of the Punjab Accord. The Barnala government was hoping to demonstrate to the Sikh community that the strategy of adopting moderate and constitutional means was more powerful in getting the demands of the Sikh community and the Punjab state accepted than the strategy of militant confrontation advocated by the militants.

The Barnala government’s hopes of demonstrating the superiority of its political strategy rested, in the immediate future, on securing Chandigarh for Punjab by 26 January 1986, as provided in the Punjab Accord. However, the change in the political priorities of the Rajiv Gandhi government since the signing of the Punjab Accord led to the humiliation of the Barnala government. Rajiv Gandhi’s government, under the powerful influence of anti-Sikh lobbies at the centre, failed to transfer Chandigarh to Punjab on the given date. This signalled the death knell of the Punjab Accord. It was a blow to the Barnala government and to the moderate tendency in Akali politics. It was a shot in the arm for the militant tendency. The Sikh militant groups had called for a congregation in the Golden Temple complex on 26 January 1986 and this attracted a massive gathering. Emboldened by this response, the militants announced the formation of a fivemember Panthic Committee as the supreme organisation to lead the Sikh struggle against the central government. All five members of the Panthic Committee were close associates of the dead Bhindranwale.

They also announced their take-over of the most important religious centres of the Sikh community, including the Golden Temple. They announced the dismissal of the existing head priests of these religious centres, who they viewed as moderate and appointed pro-militant head priests as their replacement. A resolution passed at the congregation called for stepping up the struggle against the central government in Delhi and mentioned the need to use all forms of struggle to achieve their objectives. They used radical Marxistsounding language to articulate their cultural, religious and secular aspirations: This congregation declares with full determination that the struggle of the Sikhs for achieving their rights is on and they will fight by seeking co-operation and support of all those people in India and the entire world who are struggling for free expression of their voice of conscience. The Sikhs will give full assistance to such struggling people. This congregation wishes to make it clear that the Sikhs have no conflict with any religion, community, caste, race or the population of any region, but they will retaliate with full determination against the repression by those tyrants who have snatched away their rights…This congregation 5 20 April 2007 requests the entire Sikh world (Sarbat Khalsa) that not only among the Sikhs but also in the whole of India and the entire world, in every activity and organisation of society, they should ceaselessly fight for the hegemony of morality and especially so in the realm of politics.

It is only by following the path of truth and righteousness that the destructive forces of the world can be checkmated and their tendency to squander away the wealth of society created by the sweat of human labour can be stopped and the world peace can be established. Alarmed by this upsurge of support for the militants, the central government started pressing the Barnala government to take action against them. The politically weakened Barnala government resorted to repressive police measures against the militants under pressure from the central government. This gave a further boost to the popularity of the militants. They held another impressive congregation at Amritsar on 13 April 1986 and finally, on 29 April 1986, they announced from a room in the Golden Temple complex that their goal was to achieve a sovereign Khalistan, a Sikh republic. They also announced the launch of an armed struggle under the command of their self-appointed Khalistan Commando Force to achieve this goal. The Barnala government, under the threat of dismissal by the centre if it did not take action against the Khalistani activists, sent police into the Golden Temple complex to arrest them. They had already escaped by the time the police arrived. The entry of the police into the Golden Temple on the orders of the Barnala government caused a split both in the government and the party. The government became politically weaker. Violent confrontations between armed Sikh guerrilla groups and the police increased every month.

The central government dismissed the Barnala government on 12 May 1987 and re-imposed direct central rule over Punjab. The Punjab Accord was dead. The moderate Akali project collapsed, at least for the time being. Punjab becameabattlegroundbetweenthe Indiansecurity forces, including the army, and Sikh guerrilla organisations. A large number of Sikh youths joined these organisations, which received considerable financial support from a large pool of their supporters among the Sikh diaspora. The government of Pakistan, a traditional geopolitical rival of India, also provided logistical support. Punjab remained under direct central rule via a governor until February 1992. Large-scale violations of human rights took place during the Indian security forces’ operations against the Sikh guerrillas and their supporters. The guerrillas’ retaliation against their opponents and the allies of the Indian state was no less brutal. The entire effort of the administration during the governor’s rule was directed towards defeating the Sikh insurgency. The Indian government eventually succeeded in crushing the Sikh militancy but at a very heavy human cost. The majority of the Punjabi Sikhs who died in the battles between the Indian security forces and the Sikh guerrilla organisations were young men in the prime of their productive lives.

Return of moderate politics (post-1992) The defeat of Sikh militancy was mainly a result of the vastly superior military power of the Indian central state. Assured of its military success, the 5 Indian state decided to test the constitutional arena in Punjab by holding state assembly elections in 1992 after a five-year period of direct central rule—the longest period any Indian state has been kept under uninterrupted central rule. In the election to the Punjab State Assembly held in February 1992 the Congress Party returned to power because of a boycott of the election by all the militant and almost all the moderate Akali Sikh groups. However, the poor voter turnout (a mere 20%) deprived the Congress Party government of the needed legitimacy. After a brief period of drastic decline in militancy-related violence, the militants struck back in 1995 by assassinating the Congress Party Chief Minister of Punjab, Beant Singh, on 31 August. However, Punjab has largely remained free of any serious militancy-related violence since the late 1990s. In 1997 the moderate Akali Dal, led by Parkash Singh Badal, returned to power with a massive victory. But the general perception that the Badal government was pro the rural sector turned the urban Hindu voters against it in the February 2002 elections. It lost marginal support even among rural Sikh voters because of the widely shared perception that many ministers and government officials were indulging in corruption. Contd……………………………..