The NSA on Tuesday, the banks on Monday, the FAA on Friday and Microsoft on Thursday-KBS Sidhu IAS Retd

Karan Bir Singh Sidhu: The author is a retired IAS officer of the 1984 batch, Punjab cadre, and Founder-Editor of The KBS Chronicle

Chandigarh-On Tuesday, 17 November, CNN reported, on the word of six people familiar with the matter, that NSA Net, the highly classified network on which the National Security Agency (America’s signals-intelligence agency, headquartered at Fort Meade, Maryland) carries its own internal traffic, had gone down. The sources said there was, as yet, no evidence of a cyberattack. The agency, still working out the scope of the problem, put its staff on staggered arrival times. A current and a former official hastened to add that the outage would not affect the flow of urgent intelligence to President Trump, who is in the Philippines on his way to Beijing for talks with Xi Jinping, because the government keeps several redundant and back-up channels for exactly that purpose. The NSA itself has not commented.

Taken alone, this would be an embarrassment, and large networks do fail. But it did not come alone. It came at the end of the most fragile six days American infrastructure has had in a long time, and anyone who has sat through a disaster-management review knows that the question is never only what failed, but what failed next to it.

Ian Fleming’s Goldfinger had a rule for weeks like this one, and America has spent the past week putting it to the test.

Six Days, Four Systems, One Explanation Each
Set out the dates, as a district officer sets out a case diary, working backwards from Fort Meade, and the pattern is hard to ignore.

Monday, 16 November: the banks. Customers of JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo, Bank of America, U.S. Bank, Capital One and Truist reported trouble with logins, balances, transfers and, in some cases, ATMs, and the Zelle payments network was caught in the backwash. Chase traced its problem to a software release rolled out that morning, and a source called it a bug, not a cyber issue. By Tuesday morning the outage trackers showed the banks back to normal.

Friday, 13 November: the FAA. At about 3:30 in the afternoon, Eastern time, the Federal Aviation Administration lost aircraft communications and radar feeds and ordered a nationwide ground stop, the kind of order American aviation associates with 11 September 2001. Traffic resumed at 8:15 pm. Some 12,462 flights were cancelled over the disruption, although the FAA cautions that not all of them can be laid at the ground stop’s door, and, mercifully, every aircraft in the air landed safely. Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy said the trouble began when the contractor, L3Harris, was replacing copper wiring with fibre, overloading the system; a faulty router was also under investigation. His verdict was memorably blunt: the contractor, or the equipment, “didn’t meet the moment”. The FAA said it had no indication of a cyberattack.

Thursday, 12 November: Microsoft. Microsoft 365 (Outlook, Teams, Copilot and the rest of the office suite on which much of the world’s working day now runs) went down for the better part of 24 hours, and email was hit hardest; service came back only on Friday morning. Microsoft’s Charles Lamanna put it down to a previously undetected software defect, rising traffic and reduced server capacity.

Read forwards, the sequence climbs a ladder from commerce to the state: a private software company, then the federal aviation regulator, then the banking system, then the intelligence agency itself.

Each failure came with its own plausible, mundane explanation, and each, on its own, is believable, which is precisely the difficulty.

Goldfinger’s Rule, and a Fourth Count
In Ian Fleming’s Goldfinger (1959), the villain tells James Bond, who has crossed his path once too often: “Once is happenstance. Twice is coincidence. The third time it’s enemy action.” It is a paranoid’s rule, and most intelligence services quietly live by it. America has now had four.

The case for enemy action is easily made. The President is a day away from sitting across the table from Xi Jinping. American agencies have themselves warned, since at least February 2024, that a Chinese state-backed group they christened Volt Typhoon had burrowed into American power, water, transport and communications networks, not to steal but to wait, so that it could disrupt them at a moment of China’s choosing. A second group, Salt Typhoon, was found the same year inside AT&T, Verizon and other telephone companies, lifting call records and, in chosen cases, listening in. And the first rule of good sabotage is that it should look like an accident. A competent adversary would want the post-mortem to find exactly what this one has found so far: a contractor’s wiring job, a faulty router, a software release that misbehaved.

The case for happenstance is just as strong, and so far it is the one supported by the evidence. Every cause stated publicly is mundane, and none of the companies or agencies involved has found any sign of intrusion. The FAA’s ageing equipment has been an American scandal for years; bank software releases go wrong somewhere in the world every month; and a suite as large as Microsoft 365 was always going to meet a defect its testers missed. In an economy that size, four failures in a week are less improbable than they feel, and once the first one makes the news, every subsequent glitch gets reported as part of a series.

I would add a fourth count to Goldfinger’s three. Fleming’s rule assumes that the events are independent of each other, so that a run of them demands an author. But these systems are not independent. They sit on the same few cloud providers, the same handful of contractors, the same habit of pushing software out quickly and patching it afterwards, the same decade of deferred maintenance. If the third time is enemy action, the fourth time is the system. A network that has been made fragile by concentration and cost-cutting does not need an enemy to fail. It merely makes the enemy’s work, when it comes, much easier, and very much harder to tell apart from bad luck.

Which of the four is true here, nobody outside Fort Meade yet knows, and possibly nobody inside it. The honest answer, for now, is that the investigation should be run as if it were the third, and the reform as if it were the fourth.

Wall Street, Tuesday: The Bell Rings, and the Theorists Count
All this has fallen in the week of one of the largest listings ever attempted. Anthropic, the maker of the Claude AI models (these columns weighed it against the Jio Platforms listing in October), is expected to price its shares at $70 to $78 on Wednesday, 18 November, and begin trading on the Nasdaq under the ticker ANT the next day, at a valuation of roughly $1.3 to $1.4 trillion. Jensen Huang, who resigned as NVIDIA’s chief executive on 12 November, has meanwhile offered, in a post on X, to return should its Board of Directors so decide. And when the bell rang at 9:30 on Tuesday morning in New York (8 pm in Chandigarh), the Nasdaq Composite opened 18 points, or 0.07 per cent, higher at 24,528 in what Reuters called choppy trading, while the Dow fell 221 points; by midday the small gain had gone, and all three main indices were down by about one per cent.

Inevitably, a narrative now doing the rounds, reported by the Indian cyber-crime portal The420.in, lays the outages against Anthropic’s IPO calendar and asks who profits. It offers no evidence that anyone caused or coordinated anything, and even the portal says its chronology needs independent verification. Benefiting from a fire does not make one the arsonist, and in a week as crowded as this one, every outage will fall within a day or two of somebody’s milestone.

Goldfinger’s rule is a villain’s rule. A state does not need to share his paranoia, but it would be negligent to ignore his arithmetic. America has counted to four this week, and the theorists have stopped counting altogether. The investigators in Washington will have to count more carefully than either.

 

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