Editor’s Note:It is our privilege to present “The Political Economy of the Cycles of Violence and Non-violence in the Sikh Struggle”, a scholarly article by , which will be published as a fourth and last series out of four-part series. This insightful work offers a thoughtful analysis of the historical, political, and economic dimensions of the Sikh struggle, providing readers with a deeper understanding of the factors that have shaped its evolution over time. We believe this article is of significant historical and educational value and will serve as an important resource for students, researchers, and anyone interested in Sikh history and contemporary political thought. We sincerely hope our readers will find this series both informative and engaging.— Editor
It lost the election, though narrowly, to the Congress Party led by Amarinder Singh, who was respected among Sikh voters because he had resigned in 1984 as a member of India’s parliament and from the Congress Party in protest against Operation Blue Star. He had rejoined the Congress Party later on. As the Chief Minister of Punjab, Amarinder Singh is now in the midst of a legal and political battle with his own party’s government at the centre over the question of digging a canal through the state to divert Punjab’s river waters to Haryana. If, as a result of sectarian considerations by decision makers at the centre, Punjab’s interests are ignored while resolving this conflict, this might act as a catalyst to rekindle the now defeated extremist Sikh politics. Coupled with this is the grim reality that many of the other issues that led to the starting of the Akali agitation in 1980s, eg the status of Chandigarh, the Punjabi speaking areas left out of Punjab, the demand for more federal devolution of power and conflict over the control of electricity resources remain unresolved. Conclusions Throughout the history of the Sikh community, from its birth in the 15th century to the present day, there have been alternating periods of non-violent and violent forms of struggle to survive as a community and to aspire to political power.
It is mainly the policies of the state power the Sikhs have had to deal with, that has determined their choice of methods. In choosing their methods of struggle, Sikhs did not passively retaliate against violence by choosing violence, or against non-violence by choosing non-violence. They crafted both their violent and non-violent responses in imaginative and creative ways. In their historical evolution the Sikhs have had to deal with three forms of state power: the Mughal monarchical state, the British colonial state and the Hindu-majority Indian nationalist state. They have collaborated with, as well as revolted against, these three state forms . 20 April 2007 depending upon the conjuncture of forces. In all three cases the militant/ violent tendency received a greater response from the people when the existing state power chose to use a repressive strategy against them. In contrast, a state policy of accommodating Sikh demands has generated a response either of collaboration with the existing state power if the accommodation was seen to be satisfactory, or of peaceful protest if it was seen to be unsatisfactory. The overall pattern which emerges from this is that there is no inevitability of either violence or non-violence in Sikh political practice.
Emeritus Professor of Economics
The doctrinal invocation to justify the use of non-violence or violence is also dependent uponpolitico-economic and historical conditions. There is no clear preference for either violence or non-violence in Sikh doctrine. After the traumatic period of the 1980s and 1990s the moderate tendency in Sikh politics has now regained ascendancy. However, the extremist tendency could re-emerge to prominence if the Sikh people feel that their identity is under threat and that their political aspirations are being thwarted. The Indian state seems to have learnt bitter lessons from the violent conflict with the Sikhs in the 1980s and 1990s. A policy of accommodating the Sikhs rather than repressing them seems to be the dominant trend in its current policy paradigm. The fact that, since 2004, India has a Sikh prime minister for the first time and a Sikh as army chief is symbolic of the changed policy paradigm towards the Sikhs. However, even these significant developments would prove to be merely symbolic and eventually ineffective if the collective political aspirations of the Sikhs failed to find satisfactory accommodation in the Indian political system.
This is a challenge Indian policy makers have to be constantly aware of, if a return to the politics of violent conflict is to be avoided. Acknowledgements Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 50th Anniversary Conference of the British Association for the Study of Religions, Harriss Manchester College, Oxford (September 2004), Punjab Research Group Seminar, Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford (June 2005) and the European Social Science History Conference, Amsterdam (March 2006). I received very useful comments and suggestions from the participants. I am very thankful to Henry Bainton, Meena Dhanda, Jeevan Deol, Sewa Singh Kalsi, Caroline Moughton, Eleanor Nesbitt, Joyce Pettigrew, Dennis Smith and Hannah Wheeler for comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. Thanks also to Arneet Gill for help with formatting the paper. The usual disclaimer applies. This paper is dedicated to the memory of my father Sardar Hukam Singh Gill (1917–2004). Notes 1 Computed from the Census of India data cited in Statistical Abstract of Punjab 2004, Chandigarh: Government of Punjab 2005.
The proportion of the Sikh population in Punjab in 2001 has gone down from about 63% in 1991. The proportion of the Hindu, Muslim and Christian populations has gone up from 34.5%, 1.2% and 1.1% in 1991 to 36.9%, 1.8% and 1.2% in 2001. Punjabi Sikhs in India’s total Sikh population has gone down from 78.6% in 1991 to 73.24% in 2001. The share of Sikhs in India’s total population has also gone down slightly from 2% in 1991 to 1.9% in 2001. 1991 census data taken from Statistical Abstract of Punjab 2002, Chandigarh: Punjab Government, 2003. From the anecdotal information that is available, it emerges that the most likely cause of the decline in the proportion of the Sikh population both in Punjab as well as in India is the migration of Sikhs outside India towards Western and Middle Eastern countries. The rise in the proportion of the Hindu and Muslim population in Punjab can be reasonably attributed to a very substantial migration of Hindu and Muslim workers from Uttar Pradesh and Bihar to Punjab to seek employment in the agricultural and industrial sectors. Contd……….