Donald Trump now has the beating stick and Congress has helpfully polished it. The Lindsey O Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act, signed on Friday, authorises tariffs of up to 100 per cent on major buyers of Russian energy. The duty is not automatic; Trump retains discretion over its use. Yet the law’s bipartisan passage means that pressure on India may outlast his presidency.
The Bill had remained in Washington’s legislative waiting room for months. Then came the BRICS summit in New Delhi, calling for a multipolar order, greater trade in national currencies and alternative payment systems. Within days, the House cleared the legislation. No public evidence proves that BRICS triggered the vote, but the sequence is politically telling. The summit appears to have sharpened an old American anxiety: the world is learning to conduct business beyond Washington’s financial reach.
India’s exposure is immense. It exports about $87 billion in merchandise to the US and another $119.7 billion in software services — at least $206.7 billion across these two categories alone. A 100 per cent tariff would directly strike goods, while the resulting chill would reach technology, investment and employment. Markets begin worrying long before customs officers begin collecting.
There is also awkward selectivity. Russian oil reaching India supposedly finances Moscow’s war; Russian gas reaching Europe becomes an unavoidable necessity; Russian uranium entering America remains strategically useful. The supposedly universal stick looks remarkably well calibrated when it approaches Western interests.
India cannot simply stop buying Russian oil without securing affordable alternatives. Its requirement is not ideological but mathematical: 1.4 billion people need energy. New Delhi’s official response has stressed energy security and warned of consequences for bilateral ties and global markets. If India continues importing and Washington uses its new authority talk of the end of the Indo-American romance may cease to sound exaggerated.
Could this push India, China and Russia into one geopolitical group? If Washington forces them into the same corner, it is quite possible. India mistrusts China, values America and remains uneasy about Moscow’s dependence on Beijing. But coercion can unite countries that strategy keeps apart. BRICS did not produce this law; the American reaction may nevertheless validate its argument that dependence on one market, currency and payment system is a strategic vulnerability.
A common BRICS currency remains difficult, but no longer unimaginable. Trade in national currencies, new clearing arrangements, alternative payment networks and diversified reserves are more probable. None will replace the dollar tomorrow. Yet every excessive use of American financial power gives others one more reason to prepare today.
America wants to isolate Russia. By threatening India and China together, it may accelerate the realignment it fears. A beating stick can enforce discipline; waved too freely, it can persuade those being beaten to form a club.